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Abstract
This paper analyses the reorganisation that European carriers have
i m p l e m e n t e da f t e rS e p t e m b e r1 1 t hi nt h et r a n s a t l a n t i cﬂights. We model
carriers’ conduct as a mixture of short- and long-term goals where the
weights depend on ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables (adjustment costs, ﬁnancial sit-
uation) and subjective expectations on the crisis duration. Data provide
som e supp ort to o ur c on jecture s that high adjustm ent costs in duce low
ﬂ exibility and a fo cus o n th e lo ng-term ; and that a bad ﬁ nancial situa-
tion shifts the carries attention to short-term. Finally, the analysis of the
com p osition o f s hort- a nd long-term re ac tion provid es som e insights into
the carriers’ perspectives of the crisis duration.
Keywords: Eu rop ean Airlin e I ndustry, Dyn am ic O ligop oly, C osts o f
Adjustment, Crisis.
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The ups and downs of the airline sector reﬂect ﬂuctuations in the world economy.
However, in more than 50 years since the World War II, the European Airline
industry has faced only one annual decrease in traﬃc. This was in 1991, when
the Gulf War and the ongoing recession combined to produce a minus 6% in
passenger ﬂow.
The September 11th terrorist’ attacks to the Twins Towers in New York and
to the Pentagon in Washington created a situation, which might be comparable
to 1991 but much more dramatic. The industry was already recording zero
growth due to the worldwide economy downturn. Between September 11th
and November 4th, North Atlantic traﬃc fell by 26%; there was a decrease of
more than 10% in Europe and more than 17% in the Far East. In the next
weeks, European and US carriers reduced the capacity oﬀer between European
and North Atlantic destinations, on average, by 20% and similar adjustments
occurred in other international routes.
Data on transatlantic ﬂights show that the capacity reduction diﬀerred
among carriers and destinations following a pattern which is not simple to in-
terpret. The aim of this paper is to analyse the reorganisation that European
carriers have realised after September 11th in the transatlantic ﬂights. Roughtly
speaking, we want to shed light on the carriers’ decision of capacity reduction
(or expansion) for each route. We divide the after shock period into two parts:
the short-term (i.e. the crisis period) and the long-term (the post-crisis period).
We suppose carriers to be proﬁt maximisers and we model carries’ conduct as
a mixture of short- and long-term goals.
We explain the variability of the short- and long-term conduct in terms of
ﬁrm speciﬁc variables (adjustment costs, ﬁnancial situation) and in terms of
carriers’ expectations of the crisis duration.
From an empirical point of view, we assume that the short-term tactic is
based on the evaluation of the demand fall after the September 11th and that
long-term plans are based on the proﬁtability before September 11th. The valid-
ity of the latter indicator depends on the fact that carriers’ long-term conjectures
are usually an extrapolation of past experiences.
Data provide some support to our conjectures that high adjustment costs,
corresponding to high market shares, induce low ﬂexibility and a focus on the
long-term and that a bad ﬁnancial situation shifts the carries attention to short-
term. Finally, the analysis of the composition of short- and long-term reaction
provides some insights into the carriers’ perspectives of the crisis duration.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 reviews some contributions
on the airline conduct in diﬀerent perspectives. In section 3, we present a
brief description of the airlines industry focusing on the impact of the terrorist’
attacks. In sections 4 and 5 we provide the theoretical model and the empirical
analysis, respectively. The ﬁnal conclusions are presented in section 6.
22 Review of literature
Carriers determine the capacity supply through a process called network plan-
ning. This process is usually organised in three levels:
(1) Strategic planning: alliances, buying/selling new aircraft, anticipating
new routes, usually every 1-3 years.
(2) Tactical planning: scheduled timing, numbers of frequencies and aircraft
size. It takes place every semester.
(3) Operational actions: pricing strategies and small adjustments of the net-
work to improve operations such as reducing connections time at hub, changing
aircraft size for some ad hoc day. This process follows the short-term demand
ﬂuctuation and competitor moves (day-to-day).
In this section we present a brief review of the literature on carriers conduct
organising the main contributions into three corresponding streams of research
according to the attention they posed on strategical, tactical and operational
decisions.
The ﬁrst stream (strategic choices) investigates the relation between liber-
alization, alliance and performance of the airlines. Chang and Williams (2002)
study how the European carriers have responded to the liberalized policy. De-
spite nationality clauses being removed, relatively few airlines have made full
use of the liberalisation. The market liberalization explains the strategy for
the creation of eﬀective alliances. Janic (1997) shows that the liberalization
had a signiﬁcant impact on the market structure. Airlines can grow by enter-
ing various types of mergers and alliances and the overall quality of the service
has improved due to increased ﬂight frequency. The investment issue, even if
concerning the strategic planning is analysed in the next paragraph.
The second stream (tactical choices) focuses on proﬁtability and investment
decision. For example, Chin and Tay (2001) study the implications of proﬁtabil-
ity and the investment decision on survivability of Asian airlines. Investment
decisions and proﬁtability are related to air traﬃc forecasting, cycle of orders
and deliveries, proﬁt cycle, airlines growth and survivability. The study indi-
cates that airline’s growth and proﬁtability are positively related. The likelihood
of survival increases with asset size and proﬁt. Proﬁtability and survivability
are evaluated by Smith (1997) in the framework of the European market liber-
alization. They identify some critical factors for the airlines survival: ﬁnancial
factor, cost structure, domestic market, size of operations, internationalization
and political support. Through an empirical application on European airlines
they ﬁnd that only a limited number of airlines have a fair chance to survive.
Based on the critical success factors, the largest Northern carriers enjoy stronger
positions. Among the Southern airlines, those with a large domestic market and
strong political support have a high likelihood of survival, providing they are
able to adjust their cost structure in time. Bruning and Hu (1988) identiﬁed
empirical evidences that proﬁtability of American carriers depends on ﬁrm size,
operating eﬃciency, and ﬂexibility.
The third stream of research deals with operational choices, i.e. pricing equi-
librium and market contestability. Borenstein (1989) looks at the role of the
3hub-and-spoke operational system in airline pricing policies. He concluded that
while hubs are eﬃcient operating devices for airlines in terms of the number of
diﬀerent markets the airline can serve, they are detrimental for consumers be-
cause the airlines become isolated from competition when they have a monopoly
at their hubs. This phenomenon has been termed the strength of hub. Boren-
stein made three important observations in his study of the links between high
fares and hub-and-spoke networks. First, a high (route) price charged by a com-
pany is not automatically mimicked by other carriers serving the same route,
because the latter has gained control of the market through frequency of ﬁghts
oﬀered, advantageous departure and arrival times. Second, the source of power
can be directly connected to the airlines operations at the end of the route.
Third, Borenstein found that the larger the share a carrier has of a route the
more attractive the airline to passengers.
Windle and Dresner (1995) focus on the role of the low fare carriers entrance
into markets. Questions, that they were concerned with, were the eﬀects of low
fare carriers entrance into speciﬁc markets and whether the eﬀects were long
lasting. The researchers found that market concentration was not a signiﬁcant
contributing factor to pricing on domestic markets. This seems to counter what
Borenstein (1989) had concluded, although the authors ﬁnd that when a low
fares carrier enters a market its impact on prices is more signiﬁcant than market
concentration. They produce an example of a high concentrated route served
by Southwest having lower fares than a low concentrated route served by two or
more high cost carriers. When the low/high fare dummy was removed from their
model they found the same results as Borenstein, that market concentration has
a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect.
Recent literature has proposed signiﬁcant research on the ﬁeld of the airline
crisis. In particular, Hatty and Hollmeier (2003) present a view of the airline
crisis after the September 11th. Crisis management at Lufthansa German Air-
lines is discussed in depth. In this study it is showed that the reduction of
air traﬃc demand was matched by industry capacity reduction. When demand
declines, capacity can not be immediately adjusted due to the insuﬃcient ﬂexi-
bility. Authors conclude that managing the crisis does not only aim at restoring
the pre-crisis state but rather at forming a more healthy business environmen-
tal. Gillen and Lall (2003) examine shock transmission in the airline industry
after September 11th. Their research attempts to identify three main propaga-
tion channels: trade eﬀect, alliance eﬀect and wake-up call eﬀects. As espected
they noticed that US airlines were the worst hit, Asian carriers were eﬀected
the least and recovered much earlier than their European and North American
counterparts. Low cost carriers and specialist carriers like Gandalf that cater to
business travellers were not eﬀected as much and their market recovered within
the ﬁrst four weeks of the events.
Our analysis attempt to proposes an integrated model considering opera-
tional, tactical and strategic decisions in a crisis momentum. Speciﬁcally, we
present a dynamic game-theoretical framework organised into three stages which
are a time-continuous sequence of periods. In each period carriers take opera-
tional actions (i.e. they choose a price); in each stage they choose their tactics
4(corresponding to a capacity oﬀer) and in the entire game they follow a strate-
gic planning (that is the choice of a strategy solving the overall game). The
empirical model do not consider operational decisions but focuses on tactical
and strategic planning that are driven by a short- and long-term indicators,
respectively.
A second aspect that characterises our work is the particular use of data on
a crisis period. Since this, we can clearly identify the carriers reaction to an
exogenous demand shock. The presence of a delay between the passenger fall
and the capacity reduction excludes the identiﬁcation problem.
3 The airlines sector during the crisis
The consequences of the terrorist attac k si nU n i t e dS t a t e sh a dam a j o ri m p a c t
throughout the airlines sector.
“The losses incurred due to the closure of US and Canadian airspace,
ﬂight diversions, cancellations and drop in demand have made it
necessary for companies to revise their proﬁt forecast and capacity
supply. The forecasting was dependent on an economy upswing in
the last quarter of the year which was no longer anticipated in the
wake of the 11th September event. The aviation industry has been
hit badly by the consequences of the terrorist attacks. It will require
immense eﬀorts on the part of Lufthansa staﬀ if we are to avoid an
operating loss this year”: Lufthansa Chief Executive Oﬃcer Jurgen
Weber, September 19th, 2001.
The words of Mr. Weber ﬁnd some conﬁrmations in the descriptive statistics
presented below.
<<insert table 1>
Before the terrorist attacks the traﬃc between Europe and US showed a zero
growth; afterwards the growth became negative. Table 1 presents the bookings
index1 Europe-US for the period June 01 - May 02. The demand fall started
in September (-13% of booking) and reached the lowest peak in October and
November (both -26%). The impact was more signiﬁcant for business (-31% in
September) than for leisure travellers (-11%). Business traﬃcf e l lu n t i lO c t o b e r
(-42%) while the leisure recorded the lowest peak in November (-24%).
In Table 2 we restrict our attention to the transatlantic traﬃc generated
by the European carriers. More speciﬁcally, we focus on two important indi-
cators concerning the revenue and the capacity oﬀer respectively: the revenue
1The bookings index is computed dividing the number of bookings in one period by the
number of bookings in the corresponding period of the previous year.
5passengers kilometres2 (RPK) and available seats kilometres3 (ASK).
<<insert table 2>>
Despite the revenue decreased of 3% in September and 4% in October, Euro-
pean carriers did not reduce their capacity supply until November 01, afterwards
there was a decrease in the next months.
In general, carriers reduce their capacity oﬀer through reducing the frequen-
cies, the aircraft size or closing the routes. For example, KLM adjusted its ﬂights
to USA by reducing weekly frequency to New York (from 13 to 11 frequencies),
to San Francisco (from 7 to 6 frequencies), to Miami (from 7 to 5 frequencies)
and to Detroit (from 4 to 3 frequencies). It also closed the Amsterdam-Atlanta
route and reduced the aircraft size to Canada (Montreal from Boeing 747 to
Boeing 767, Toronto from Boeing 747 to McDouglas 11).
<<insert table 3>>
Table 3 shows the implanted capacity and the planned capacity, as it was in
May 02, for the top 10 destinations. Data before May 02 do not provide any in-
formation on the planned capacity since before that date carriers do not present
credible plans. In order to correctly interpret the table, it is worth noting that
data are computed dividing the implanted or planned capacity in the quarter
by the implanted capacity in the corresponding quarter of the previous year.
Therefore, the index referred to the quarters (Q3-02 to Q2-03) are compared to
the pre-crisis period whilst the index referred to Q4-03 is compared to the crisis
period. This explains why the index in the ﬁrst ﬁve columns is lower than 100
and in the last column is equal to or higher than 100.
For example, European carriers reduced their capacity oﬀer to New York
by 29% in Q1-02 but the planned capacity has been increased by 20% in the
Q4-02. Since that the capacity reduction is larger than the planned increase,
the values previous the shock are not completely recovered. Other routes, as
Atlanta or Los Angeles presented diﬀerent patterns. The latter recorded a strong
capacity reduction just before the crisis period, whilst the former presents a
small variation. In any case, it does not seem that there the planned capacity
identiﬁes a full recovery of the demand.
Table 4 shows the implanted capacity and the planned capacity, as it was in
May 02, of European carriers ﬂying on intercontinental routes. As previously, we
observe diﬀerent patterns in data. All carriers (except Iberia) reduced their oﬀer
in Q4-01 but there is a strong variability in their choices. Alitalia, that before
the crisis (Q3-01) was expanding its oﬀer, after the crisis drastically reduced it
(-24%), whilst Lufthansa, which has registered a similar path in Q3-01, reduced
less (-8%).
2The revenue passengers kilometres is the number of passengers who generated revenue
(free travellers are excluded) normalised by the length of the journey in kilometres.
3The available seats kilometres is the number of seats oﬀered by the carriers on a given
group of lines times the route length (in kilometres).
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The main concern of the airline strategy is the duration of the crisis. KLM
President & CEO Leo van Wijk released a press statement regarding the Dutch
company:
”...many passengers are cancelling their reservations and we can ex-
pect diminishing load factors as result. Demand is diminishing on
various intercontinental routes and I do not expect this to change in
the near future...”
Analogously, Lufthansa CEO Jurgen Weber claimed that there is uncertainty
about the length and eﬀect of the crisis and the future developments in the
aviation industry.
3.1 An important element of the carriers’ conduct: the
adjustment costs
At the end of section 2, we have characterised carriers behaviour as the sum
of operational actions, tactics and strategies. In this sub-section, we provide
a link between the actual conduct of the carriers and the main assumption of
our theoretical model. More speciﬁcally, we want to explain why carriers are
recalcitrant to change their capacity oﬀers in the day-to-day activity and how
carriers decisions of reducing the capacity oﬀer after September 11th are a part
of a strategic planning concerning both the crisis and the post-crisis tactics.
Any modiﬁcation of the ﬂight supply involves costs. For instance, the carrier
that decides to enter a new route needs to have new rights at airport (slot), to
organise new staﬀ, promote and advertise the new route, launch price actions,
check and re-adapt feeding strategies and so on. Moreover, in the short-term,
t h ea i r c r a f tf o rt h en e wr o u t es h o u l db em o v e df r o mar o u t et ot h en e wo n e
and the logistic activity should be adjusted to the new aircraft rotations. Also
reducing frequencies or closing a route is a costly decision seeing that a carrier
needs to change the aircraft rotations or deﬁnitely to ground a plane. We call
adjustment costs the costs that a carrier incurs when it modiﬁes its ﬂight
supply. It is worth noting that adjustment costs are ﬁrst of all set-up costs and
hence are higher when carriers want to enter or expand a route than when they
want to exit or reduce it.
Adjustment costs usually are high for large carriers (carriers with higher mar-
ket shares) since they employ local ground staﬀ whilst are low for small carriers
that usually outsource ground activities. In addition, closing and opening an
intercontinental route imply a re-optimisation of the network and a re-adjusting
of the feeding strategies which is more complex and costly for larger carriers.
Other factors as speciﬁc network characteristics (conﬁguration hub and spoke,
p o i n tt op o i n t )a n dﬂexibility of the ﬂeet, i.e. the number of aircraft that can
7operate both on short and long haul route can impact on the importance of the
adjustment costs4.
>From a theoretical prospective adjustment costs represent a barrier to enter
or exit the market and support the argument that the airline industry is not a
contestable market but a multi-market oligopoly (Berry, 1992). The theory of
contestable markets states that a market can be perfectly competitive with only
a small number of ﬁrms operating in the market. This is true if the costs of
entering and exiting the market are relatively low and if the incumbent reaction
is delayed. If the carrier on the market (incumbent) rises the price above the
competitive price then a new carrier (entrant) can enter the market with a lower
fare, make proﬁts, and exit before the reaction. A quick price reaction of the
incumbent as well as adjustment costs inhibit the potential entrant to apply
this ”hit and run” strategy.
The existence of adjustment costs motivates the decision of changing the
capacity oﬀer only few times a year and in the meantime to compete in prices.
Moreover, adjustment costs induce path-dependency since previous capacity of-
fer impacts on the following choices. Therefore, closing or reducing routes dur-
ing the crisis period implies direct adjustment costs but also indirect adjustment
costs, and the latter comes when the carrier needs to re-expand.
4 Theoretical model
We consider an oligopolistic market5 consisting of two ﬁrms, namely A and B.
They produce a homogeneous good and compete in Bertrand-like price with
limited capacity. More speciﬁc a l l y ,w ea s s u m et h a tﬁrms revise their capacity
oﬀer rarely since modifying their ﬂight supply, they incur into adjustment costs.
The model is set in a continuous time framework and ﬁrms are proﬁtm a x -
i m i s e r s .T ok e e pt h i n g ss i m p l e ,w ea s s u m et h a ta td a t e0t h e r ei sa nu n p r e d i c t e d
negative shock (that is described as a temporary reduction of the demand) and
that ﬁrms modify their capacity oﬀer only twice, one when the shock has oc-
curred and another when it ends. In what follows we present a basic version
w h e r ew ea s s u m et h a tt h ed u r a t i o no ft h ec r i s i si sk n o w nj u s ta f t e rt h es h o c k
is occurred. At the end of the section, we informally present some extensions
which do not substantially change the main results of the model. Therefore, we
start assuming no uncertainty on the duration of the crisis, no ﬁnancial con-
straints and no diﬀerences in the adjustment costs. The timing of the game is
as follows:
• (Stage 0)B e f o r et i m e0, the market is on a long-term equilibrium, that
means the capacity that ﬁrms A and B have chosen is the solution of a
4For instance the Boeing 767 can operate both short route within Europe and long haul
between Europe and US whilst the Boeing 747-400 can not economically operate routes under
4000 km.
5In this model, we focus on a single market that corresponds to a single intercontinental
route.
8capacity-price game6. The outcome of this stage-game is J0, K0 and p0,
where J0 and K0 are respectively the capacity choice of ﬁrm A and B at
stage 0 and p0 is the equilibrium price at stage 0.
• (Stage 1)A tt i m e0, there is an unpredicted (negative) shock in the de-
mand with certain duration θ > 0. Firms change their capacity7 and
afterwards, they enter a price-game. The outcome is summarised by J1,
K1, p1.
• (Stage 2)A tt i m eθ, the negative shock ends. Firms modify their capacities
with a cost that is increasing in the capacity change8.A f t e r w a r d s ,ﬁrms
play a price-game. In this case, the outcome is J2, K2, p2.
We solve the model backwards starting from stage 2,t h e nw em o v et os t a g e
1.
We will only focus on the behaviour of ﬁrm A, since analogous solution is for
ﬁrm B.T h eo v e r a l lp r o ﬁto fﬁrm A can be described as a sum of the discounted
instantaneous proﬁts. We call πA
1 and πA
2 the instantaneous proﬁto fﬁrm A at














where r i st h ei n t e r e s tr a t ea n de−rt is the discount factor.
The second stage equilibrium is computed assuming that ﬁrms have already
chosen their capacity in the ﬁrst stage.
The inverse demand in the second stage is p2 = a − Q2 where Q2 is the
quantity supplied by both ﬁrms. During the crisis period (0,θ) the demand was
p1 = b − Q1 with 0 <b<a .A tt i m et ∈ [θ,∞), ﬁrms A and B maximise their
proﬁtg i v e nJ1 and K1,w h e r eJ1 and K1 are respectively the capacity choice of
ﬁrm A and B in period 1.A tt i m et = θ, they choose the capacity J2 and K2,
afterwards they compete in a Bertrand-like price competition10.
In the second stage, per period proﬁto fﬁrm A is:
πA
2 =( b − c − J2 − K2)J2 − D(J1,J 2,δ) (2)
6Because no costs of adjustment are assumed in stage 1, the equilibrium levels before time
0 d on o ti m p a c to nt h ec h o i c e si ns t a g e1 and 2 but we maintain this assumption because it
is necessary to consistently compute the capacity change.
7For simplicity, in the ﬁrst stage, the capacity adjustment is costless.
8See for example Gould (1968).
9Because ﬁrms can not change their capacity oﬀer during the stage, their per period proﬁt
is constant.
10We assume that ﬁrms can not collude so that the equilibrium is given by the solution of
the static capacity-price game as in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). For a critical analysis of
the outcome of the capacity-price game see Davidson and Deneckere (1990).
9where c is the unit-cost for the capacity setting and D(J1,J 2,δ)=δ(J2−J1)2
are the (per-period) adjustment costs11.W ed e ﬁne J∗
2 = J∗
2 (J1,K 1) the optimal
capacity level in the second stage as function of J1 and K1. Hence, after some
computations, the solution of the second stage game is:
J∗
2 (J1,K 1)=
(1 + 2δ)(a − c)+4 δ (1 + δ)J1 − 2δK1
4(1+δ)
2 − 1
Note that the optimal level J∗
2 is aﬀected by the costs of adjustment and
by the decisions taken in the ﬁrst stage, namely J1 and K1.T h e ﬁrst stage
instantaneous proﬁto fﬁrm A is given by:
πA
1 =( b − c − J1 − K1)J1
The ﬁrms’ behaviour in the ﬁrst stage is drawn by the optimisation of the














2 (J1,K 1) and K∗
2 = K∗
2 (J1,K 1) are
the optimal capacity levels in the second stage respectively of A and B;a n dD
are the adjustment costs of A. The solution of this optimisation problem is the
reaction function of ﬁrm A in stage one.












When ﬁrm A maximises the overall proﬁt it balances its choice between the
short-term eﬀect and long-term eﬀect. The short-term eﬀect is the traditional
result of the duopoly theory:
dπA
1






























is composed by 4 diﬀerent impacts. The ﬁrst and second terms of the RHS
of equation (4) are null because J1 does not directly aﬀect πA
2 and because of
t h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m :
∂πA
2
∂J2 =0 . The third term captures the strategic eﬀect
and corresponds to the impact of J1 on πA











4(1+δ)2−1. The sign of the strategic eﬀect is always positive because the second
stage actions are strategic substitutes (i.e. the reaction curves are downward
11For technical reasons, we assume that the adjsutment costs are persistent, that is they
span in the interval [θ,∞). Similar results can be obtained under the assumption that they
only realyse at time θ.
10sloping12). In fact, through increasing the capacity in the ﬁrst stage a ﬁrm
forces its competitor to reduce its capacity in the second stage. In literature
this eﬀect is called pre-emption. In the limit case (when δ =0 ), the strategic
eﬀect is not present.






∂J1 =2 δ (J∗
2 − J1) and is positive as soon as J∗
2 − J1 > 0.I tc a p t u r e s
the resistance of a ﬁrm in reducing its oﬀer in the ﬁrst period since they have to
bear high costs in the second period for increasing the capacity. Also this term
is null when δ =0 .
The presence of adjustment costs D, complicates the optimisation problem.
In fact, the equilibrium solution in the ﬁrst stage is characterised by strategic
considerations as well as cost considerations on the choice of the second stage.
The optimisation problem is clearly simpliﬁed when δ =0 , where the equilibrium
solutions are the usual one of a static duopolistic game: J∗
1 = Jb = b−c
3 and
J∗
2 = Ja = a−c







R(1 + 2δ)(2δ +3 )
2 (b − c)+8 δ (1 + δ)
2 (a − c)
R(1 + 2δ)(2δ +3 )
2 +8 δ(1 + δ)
2 − 2
3δ (2δ +3 )
(5)
Rearranging previous equation, we have:
J∗
1 =( 1+o)(λJb +( 1− λ)Ja) (6)
where λ =
R(1+2δ)(2δ+3)2





In order to simplify the discussion of (6), we will focus on the second part of
the equation13. The second bracket indicates that the solution is a combination
of the long-term solution and the short-term solution of the static game. The
weight λ and (1 − λ) depend on δ (the adjustment costs) and R (the duration
of the crisis). Diﬀerent values of these parameters modify the weights of short-
and long-term solution of the static problem. If λ is close to 0 (R low or δ high)
the solution J∗
1 is close to Ja that is the long-term solution; contrary, if λ is
close to 1 the solution J∗
1 is close to Jb, that is the short-term solution.
Hereafter, we investigate the relationship between long-term and short-term
proﬁtability and the variation of the capacity oﬀer.
We deﬁne ∆S = J∗
1 −J∗
0 the variation of the capacity supply, ∆P =( b − a)
the fall in the short-term proﬁtability and Y =( a − c) the long-term proﬁtabil-




R(1 + 2δ)(2δ +3 )
2 ∆P +8 δ (1 + δ)
2 Y
R(1 + 2δ)(2δ +3 )
2 +8 δ (1 + δ)
2 − 2
3δ (2δ +3 )
(7)
12See: Fundemberg and Tirole (1984) and Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1995).
13The ﬁrst bracket is greater than one when δ > 0 but is approximatly 1 whatever R is not
too small, so that we can neglect it from our discussion. In fact o<0.01 when R>0.6 for
every value of δ,a n do<0.1 when R>0.2.
11We deﬁne αS and αL the reactivity of the capacity variation to a change of







R(1 + 2δ)(2δ +3 )
2
R(1 + 2δ)(2δ +3 )
2 +8 δ(1 + δ)
2 − 2








8δ (1 + δ)
2
R(1 + 2δ)(2δ +3 )




Hence, replacing αS and αL in (7) we have:
∆S = αS∆P + αLY (10)
Equation (10) shows that the capacity reduction (or expansion) is a mixture
of short- and long-term proﬁtability14 and equations (8) and (9) indicate that
αS and αL depend on δ and R.
A change of the adjustment costs and of the duration of the crisis modiﬁes
the composition of the optimal reaction of the ﬁrms.
The ratio αS/αL = 1
8R(1 + 2δ)
(2δ+3)2
δ(δ+1)2 provides some indications on the re-
sponsiveness of the ﬁrm to a change in the adjustment costs. It is simple to verify
that the ratio is decreasing in δ, meaning that an increase in the adjustment
costs shifts the attention from the short-term to the long-term goals. There-
fore ﬁrms care more about the future situation since that higher adjustment
costs imply more pre-emption and more expanses to adjust to the long-term
equilibrium.
The ratio αS/αL c a nb ea l s ou s e di no r d e rt oa n a l y s et h ei m p a c to ft h e
duration of the crisis on the strategy composition. When the duration is short,
αS/αL is large, while when the duration is long, αS/αL is small. This point
has a very simple interpretation. If the shock is long, each ﬁrm will focus on
the crisis period by reacting on the demand reduction. If the shock is short, the
decision can be based on the post-crisis prospective, and hence on the long-term
market proﬁtability. Therefore when the duration is short the capacity reaction
is driven by long-term proﬁtability, whilst if the duration is long, the capacity
reaction depends on short-term proﬁtability.
F i n a l l y ,w eh a v et os t r e s st h a ta sδ increases the carriers are less ﬂexible.
When carriers have low adjustment costs, they strongly react to a shock and
when they have high adjustment costs they weakly react. We will clarify15 this
argument in section 5.3.
14In section 5, we will base our empirical analysis on equation (10). In section 5.3, ﬁgure 2,
we will provide a graphical representation of αS and αL as a function of R and δ.
15A formal interpretation of ﬂexibility is as follows. Let J∗ (δ,R) be the capacity when the
adjustment costs are δ and a measure of the lasting of crisis is R.F o ra n yδ and δ0 such that
δ0 < δ, for every R ∈ (0,∞),t h e r ei saR0 ∈ (0,∞) such that (a) d
daJ∗ (δ,R) < d
daJ∗ (δ0,R 0)
and (b) d
dbJ∗ (δ,R) < d
dbJ∗ (δ0,R 0). Moreover, under the same conditions, there is not an R0
such that both the inequalities hold if δ0 > δ.
12In what follows, we present the main conclusions of the extention of previous
analysis in an informal way. We focus on three diﬀerent situations: (1) when
there is uncertainty about the crisis duration, (2) when ﬁrms have diﬀerent
adjustment costs and (3) when ﬁrm B has a ﬁnancial constraint. In these cases
we also observe diﬀerent combinations of the short- and long-term indicators for
the determination of the equilibrium choice.
First, we consider the case where ﬁrms have uncertainty about the duration
of the crisis16.E a c hﬁrm can base their predictions on their private information
(f.e. the result of their research team and of the task-force created to face up the
crisis). Each ﬁrm formulates their expectations independently from the other
and chooses a capacity level. We assume that there are only two possible states
of nature: θ = {θL,θS},w h e r e 17 θL > θS.W ea s s u m et h a te a c hﬁrm does not
have knowledge of the opponent expectations and it bases its choice on its own
information. If the ﬁrm expects θ = θL it will focus more on the short-term
aspects and hence αL is low and αS is large. If it expects θ = θS it will be the
opposite: αS is low and αL large.
Second, we consider the case where ﬁrms have diﬀerent adjustment costs,
for example δA > δB. In this situation, ﬁrm A will be more reactive to the
long-term while ﬁrm B will be more reactive on the short-term.
Finally, we now assume that ﬁrm B can not choose to react as before since
it has a ﬁnancial constraint (that may depend on low liquidity or high pressure
from investors, high debts and so on). In particular, ﬁrm B can ﬁnd diﬃ-
cult, all things equal, to maintain high K∗
1 in correspondence of low short-term
proﬁtability even if long-term proﬁtability will be high. Therefore, ﬁrm B is
characterised by low or null reaction to long-term indicators and strong reac-
tion to short-term indicators that means high values of αS and low values of
αL.V i c ev e r s a ,ﬁrm A, knowing the situation of B, coeteris paribus, will proﬁt
by this situation, keeping higher αL.
5 Empirical analysis
In this section the hypothesis that the capacity choice on a certain route depends
on short- and long-term proﬁtability has been investigated by an econometric
analysis. Three cases are analysed. First, we test the basic properties of the
theoretical model investigating how the capacity supply reacts to a demand fall
and to the potential yield. Second, the impact of a demand fall is decomposed
by carriers. Finally, the same procedure is applied to decompose the potential
yield by carriers.
5.1 Data
We collected data on number of passengers per ﬂow, available seats, average rev-
enue per destinations and distance in kilometres from Europe to North American
16See also Bashyam (1996).
17Where L stands for ”long” duration and S for ”short” duration.
13destinations. The database contains information on traﬃc ﬂows from Europe 18
to the top 10 North American destinations19 for the top 9 European carriers20.
Since each carrier operates with hub and spoke structure (so that a interconti-
nental route decision only concerns with hub-destination and not with every city
pair), traﬃc ﬂows have been aggregated as described in the following example
(see: Figure 1).
<<insert Figure 1>>
A carrier (KLM) ﬂies on the intercontinental route (f.e. Amsterdam-New
York) carrying traﬃc from the hub (Amsterdam) and the spokes (Manchester,
Dusseldorf, Venice, etc..) to the ﬁnal destination (New York). In order to deter-
mine the number of intercontinental passengers (Amsterdam-New York) we sum
up the passengers originating from hub (Amsterdam) and spokes (Manchester,
Dusseldorf, Venice, etc..) to the ﬁnal destination (New York).
Data on the corresponding capacity supply is retrieved from OAG database.
Finally, data on yield have been collected from BSP database and concern the
average revenue generated from Europe to the each North American destination.
Based on the above mentioned data, we compute the following variables:
∆Sij: CAPACITY (Percentage variation of seats supplied). It is calculated
as the total number of seats oﬀered by the carrier i to the North American
destination j in November 01 minus the number of seats in September 01 divided







Yij: YIELD (Yield per available seat kilometre before the 11th September 01,
April-August 01). It is total revenue rj generated by the total market (all points
of sales in Europe) to the US destination j divided by the total passengers pj
ﬂown to the destination j times the distance dj. Finally, to better approximate
the real yield (per ﬂight), we correct this expression by the load factor (lfij)






As already mentioned, in this paper we assume that YIELD is the measure of
the long-term proﬁtability. Other authors used a similar measure of long-term
proﬁtability. For instance, Bruning and Hu (1988) measured the proﬁtb ya
18In this analysis we exclude the city pairs with less than 300 bookings per year. It means
that we cover more than 95% of the traﬃct ot h et o p1 0N o r t hA m e r i c a nd e s t i n a t i o n s .
19In our analysis, we deﬁne North America as Canada and US only. We exclude Mexican
destinations due to the speciﬁcity of this market. The destinations are: New York, Chicago,
Newark, Toronto, Washington, Atlanta, Los Angeles, Boston, Miami, San Francisco.
20Those are: Air France, Alitalia, British Airways, Aer Lingus, KLM, Iberia, Lufthansa,
Scandinavian Airlines and Swiss (Air).
14passenger proﬁtability index which was the product of the revenue to cost ratio
and the load factor. Indeed, information before the crisis is likely the basis to
generate forecasting of the market situation after the crisis.
∆Pij: PAX (Percentage variation of bookings made in September 01 for the







XXi: Dummy variable designating the airlines i. It takes the following
form: AF=Air France, AZ=Alitalia, BA=British Airways, EI=Aer Lingus,
KL=KLM, IB=Iberia, LH=Lufthansa, SK=SAS, SR=Swiss (Air).
<< insert Table 5 >>
Table 5 presents some descriptive statistics of the main variables included
in the econometric analysis. Data are presented per carriers and some extra
information such as alliance and market share before and after the crisis are
included in the table. Speciﬁcally, the third and fourth column provide an
insight of the 11th September impact per carrier in terms of capacity (third
column), and passenger (fourth column). We notice that Alitalia, Iberia, and
Swiss faced the main passenger reduction (about 35%) and as a consequence
the capacity was decreased by 24% for Alitalia, by 35% for Swiss but increased
by 1% for Iberia. The reason for the Iberia increasing lays in the first reaction
of Iberia. The Spanish carrier reduced drastically the frequencies to New York
and switch the aircraft to operate to Miami.
The ﬁfth column presents the YIELD variable.
Finally the last three columns provide information on market share pre and
post September 11th. Among the European carriers British and SAS gained
market share after the crisis and Lufthansa, Aer Lingus and Alitalia lost re-
spectively 8%, 25%, 33% of their market share. Iberia and AirFrance did not
change their market position and Swiss lost almost all of the market due to its
bankrupting21. In the next paragraph we try to explain these carriers conduct
by means of econometric tools.
5.2 Econometric analysis
Three models are speciﬁed to test the hypothesis that capacity choice on a
certain route depends on short- and long-term proﬁtability.
Equation (11) related the capacity change to the variation of the YIELD
and PAX variables as presented in equation (10):
∆Sj = α0 + α1Yj + ∆Pj + ²j (11)
21Swiss Air and Sabena bankrupted after September the 11 and demerged. Swiss is the new
name of Swiss Air. The new company has been established on the old one after a few weeks.
15The estimation of this equation, presented in Table 6, emphasises the strong
eﬀect of route proﬁtability and demand shock on capacity supplied. The regres-
sion analysis explains one third of the variance of ∆Sj.T h ec o e ﬃcients present
the correct sign and are signiﬁcant.
PAX coeﬃcient equals to 0.61, which means that a 10% of the total demand
reduction in the market induces the carriers to reduce the capacity by 6.1%.
PAX variable measures the passenger variation occurred immediately after the
crisis. As no carrier has changed their capacity oﬀer in the months after the
crisis, PAX does not depend by the change in the capacity oﬀer and hence is
exogenous to the model. Consequently, no identiﬁcation problems are generated
due to simultaneous changes in demand and supply behaviour.
YIELD coeﬃcient is 5.7, which means that an increase of 12$ of revenue per
passenger on a ﬂight of 6500km will bring to a capacity increase of 1%.
<<insert table 6>>
Speciﬁc reactions of the carriers to short-term and long-term proﬁtability
are computed in the following estimates. In equation (12) we have decomposed
PAX by carriers.
∆Sj = α0 + α1Yj +
X
i
βi∆Pj · XXi + ²j (12)
The OLS estimation is presented in Table 7. The estimation explains 43%
of the variance although not all the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at
95%. The null hypotheses on the dummy coeﬃcients of Air France, British
Airways, Lufthansa and SAS are not rejected, which means that the reaction
to the demand shock is low or null. The coeﬃcients of Alitalia, KLM, Swiss
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and around 0.7. Iberia and Eer Lingus
coeﬃcients are still signiﬁcant but with a stronger magnitude resulted into a
value of around 1.2.
Hence, three groups with similar reactions to the demand shock can be
identiﬁed. The ﬁrst group, composed of Air France, British Airways, Lufthansa,
SAS presented a low or null reaction, a second group including Alitalia, KLM
and Swiss had a medium reaction and a third group formed by Aer Lingus and
Iberia resulted the most sensible.
In equation (13) we have decomposed YIELD by carriers.
∆Sj = αo + α1∆Pj +
X
i
βiYj · XXi + ²j (13)
The OLS estimation of the equation (12) is presented in Table 8. The co-
eﬃcients of the speciﬁc carrier variables are all signiﬁcant except for Swiss and
Iberia. Based on the value of these coeﬃcients we can identify again three
groups. The ﬁrst group includes Swiss and Iberia, with no signiﬁcant YIELD
coeﬃcients (low or null reaction), the second includes KLM, SAS, Lufthansa
with medium reaction to the YIELD and the last group formed by Eer Lingus,
AirFrance, Alitalia, British Airways with high reaction.
16<< insert table 8 >>
In the next section the results are commented and interpreted in order to
draw a picture of the airlines conduct.
5.3 Results
The main outcomes of the theoretical model can be explained by means of a
simple scatter plot22 (Figure 2).
<<insert Figure 2>>
The sensitivity of the carriers to short- and long-term proﬁtability are dis-
played respectively on the horizontal axis and on the vertical axis. A point
located on the upper left side identiﬁes a carrier with long-term goals. On
the other hand, a point plotted in the lower right side identiﬁes a carrier which
pursues short-term goals. Carriers plotted in the middle adopt a mixed conduct.
The graph shows three diﬀerent lines, each one referring to a diﬀerent level of
adjustment costs. The closer the line to the origin and the higher the adjustment
costs. The ﬁrst line on the left side represents a carrier with high adjustment
costs, the second one represents a carrier with intermediate adjustment costs and
the third represents a carrier with low adjustment costs. The three markers on
each line identify carriers with diﬀerent expectations of crisis duration but with
the same adjustment costs. The left upper plot on the line indicates expectation
of short duration, the lowest on the same line indicates expectation of long crisis
duration. Also a ﬁnancial situation modiﬁes the markers location in the graph:
the stronger is the ﬁnancial constraint and the higher is the reactivity to short-
term proﬁtability and the lower is the reactivity to long-term proﬁtability.
The main factors aﬀecting the carriers conduct and hence their positioning
on the graph are adjustment costs and expectation on the crisis duration.
Adjustment costs reduce the ﬂexibility of a carrier into three ways. Firstly,
they decrease the mean ﬂexibility making ﬁr m sl e s sr e s p o n d e n tt os h o r t -a n d
long-term variables. Indeed the line corresponding to high adjustment costs is
the closest to the origin. Secondly, they decrease the discretional ﬂexibility since
diﬀerent expectations on the crisis duration have low impact on the carrier’s
conduct. Indeed the length of the line is short. Finally, adjustment costs reduce
the short-term ﬂexibility, because ﬁrms become more interested in long-term
proﬁtability. Therefore, the line is close to the vertical axis. For these reasons,
we deﬁne a ﬂexible carrier, a carrier with low adjustment costs and a non-
ﬂexible carrier a carrier with high adjustment costs.
In this perspective, we expect that ﬂexible carriers are located on a upper
line whilst non-ﬂexible carriers on a lower line.
<<insert table 9>>
22This graph is generated assuming R =0 .1,0.2,0.3 and δ =0 .5,1,1.5.
17Table 9 presents two indicators, which provide information on the ﬁnancial
condition and the adjustment costs of the 9 European carriers. The ﬁnancial
indicator is presented in the ﬁrst column. It consists in a qualitative judgement
of the balance sheet based on debt to turnover ratio, cash ﬂow to turnover.
The second column presents the market shares for the traﬃcb e t w e e nE u r o p e
to North Atlantic over the period April-June 00 of the 9 European carriers.
As mentioned in section 2, market shares are a proxi for the costs of adjust-
ment. Following this assumption, Lufthansa and British Airways are carriers
with the highest adjustment costs (with a 10.8% and 10.1% of the market re-
spectively), followed by Air France (6.6%) and KLM (5.2%), then Swiss (3.2%),
Alitalia (3.0%) and ﬁnally Iberia (1.8%), Air Lingus (1.6%) and Scandinavian
Airlines (1.5%).
Hereafter we present the result of econometric analysis. We assumed in the
previous paragraphs that the YIELD is the measure of the long-term proﬁtabil-
ity and the PAX variation is the measure for short-term proﬁtability. Therefore,
we can use the framework of ﬁgure 2 and by displaying on the horizontal axis the
PAX coeﬃcients of equation (12) and on the vertical axis the YIELD coeﬃcients
of equation (13).The estimated coeﬃcients are ploted in ﬁgure 3
<<insert Figure 3>>
Assuming a linking line is created between British Airways and Lufthansa
and moving out of the origin with other parallel lines we can order the diﬀerent
behaviour of carriers depending on their ﬂexibility. On the lowest line we locate
Lufthansa and British Airways. On the next lines we locate Air France and
KLM, followed by Alitalia. Aer Lingus and Iberia are located on the highest
lines.
Swiss and Scandinavian Airlines do not ﬁt this ordering. Scandinavian Air-
lines has 1.5% of the market share and should be plotted somewhere closer to
Iberia and Aer Lingus. However, the Nordic carrier is plotted very close to
Lufthansa. This might be explained by the strong commercial relationship be-
tween the two carriers. Apparently SAS is mimicking the Lufthansa strategy
and the partnership aﬀects not only commercial activities but also strategic
actions.
The graphical position of the Swiss airlines might be explained by the ﬁnan-
cial situation that the carrier was facing at the time of the crisis. In fact, the
theoretical model suggests that the ﬁnancial constraints move carriers toward a
short-term strategy. This is evident from the scatter, Swiss reacts to the crisis
with a short-term strategy.
The expectation on the crisis duration is the second factor that eﬀect the
carrier conduct. In December 2001 no carrier has revealed their network planning
for the next 12 months. As the crisis prediction is a strategic variable the carriers
avoided as much as possible to give any external signal to the competitors. For
this reason it was impossible to collect reliable data to measure this variable. We
have no choice but to assume that the theoretical model is correct and make some
kind of qualitative considerations. Combining ﬁgures 2 and 3 we notice that
18British Airways expected a much shorter duration than Lufthansa. They lay on
the same line but with opposite behaviours. Air France and Alitalia were more
optimistic than Lufthansa. If it is not the case, the YIELD reaction of the two
carriers should be lower than the one of Lufthansa. The same considerations can
be applied to the other carriers. For example, Iberia and Aer Lingus expected
longer duration of the crisis than KLM and KLM shorter than Lufthansa. Swiss
should have the shorterst expected duration of the crisis but again its strategy
might result from the ﬁnancial problems of the company that forces its reaction
in the short-term.
In table 10, we have classiﬁed the carriers’ conduct by ﬂexibility and expec-
tations.
<<insert table 10>>
British Airways expected a quick recovering of the crisis and is classiﬁed
as non-ﬂexible carrier. This can be deducted from the dominance of long-term
conduct and a high market share. Lufthansa is classiﬁed as a non-ﬂexible carrier
with long expectations. Indeed its reaction was low. Air France and KLM seem
to have similar reactions, i.e. a conduct balancing long-term and short-term
proﬁtability. They are both classiﬁed as medium ﬂexible carriers with medium
expectations on crisis duration. Small carriers like Iberia and Aer lingus are
ﬂexible. They expected the crisis to be short and therefore they also reacted
on long-term proﬁtability. Alitalia is a medium-high ﬂexible carrier with short
lasting expectations. We have excluded from our classiﬁcation SAS and Swiss.
SAS conduct could be easily included in our model only if we assume that the
commercial agreement with Lufthansa involves also strategic cooperation im-
plying a mimicking behaviour to the German carrier. Swiss conduct is explaned
by its ﬁnancial situation which reduced the set of strategic choices to the dis-
advantages of long-term component. For this reason we omit it as we can not
easily discover its prediction on the duration.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the conduct of Eu-
ropean carriers after September 11th. An important assumption of the model
is the existence of positive adjustment costs, that is carriers face diﬃculties to
reinstate the closed route. Adjustment costs introduce some rigidities in the
carriers’ conduct reducing their ﬂexibility. Indeed, non-ﬂexible carriers typi-
cally present small reaction to short- and long-term variables and a conduct
oriented to long-term component. This behaviour results from the fact that a
non-ﬂexible carrier sets high capacity levels during the crisis to push the com-
petitors out of the market and to reduce the set-up costs of re-entering. On
the other hand, ﬂexible carriers present high responsiveness to both short- and
long-term proﬁtability and a conduct driven by short-term goals. They can be
small during the crisis period to reduce the losses and free to expand in the
19post-crisis period. Carriers’ strategies are also aﬀected by expectations on the
crisis duration. If a carrier expects a long duration then its conduct shifts to the
short-term indicator. If the expected duration is short then the carrier bases its
strategy on the long-term variable.
In general, carriers’ conduct, except for SAS, Swiss, ﬁts the theoretical
framework. As expected, the conduct of larger carriers as British Airways and
Luthansa is in accordance with a proﬁle of non-ﬂexible carrier, the conduct of
medium-sized carriers as AirFrance, KLM and Alitalia corresponds to a proﬁle
of medium ﬂexible carrier and ﬁnally the behaviour of Iberia and Aer Lingus,
the smaller carrier corresponds to a situation of high ﬂexibility. Observing the
mix of short- and long-term goals, we also ﬁnd that British Airways, Alitalia,
Iberia and Aer Lingus are optimistic about the duration of the crisis whilst Air
France, KLM and especially Lufthansa are more pessimistic expecting a long
duration of the crisis.
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21Table 1
Bookings Index Europe - US (all carriers)
Month Economy Business Total
Jun. 01 102 94 101
Jul. 01 98 86 97
Aug. 01 98 87 97
Sep.01 89 69 87
Oct. 01 77 58 74
Nov. 01 76 66 74
Dec. 01 83 72 81
Gen. 01 83 75 82
Feb. 01 83 81 83
Mar. 01 84 76 83
Apr. 01 73 84 74
May. 01 79 79 79
Source: KLM internal dB
Table 2
RPK/ASK Index (European carriers)
Month RPK ASK
Jun. 01 96 101
Jul. 01 94 101
Aug. 01 99 102
Sep.01 97 101
Oct. 01 96 101
Nov. 01 74 85
Dec. 01 67 82
Gen. 01 69 74
Feb. 01 79 76
Mar. 01 83 76
Apr. 01 87 77
May. 01 85 77
Source: AEA
22Table 3
Scheduled and planned capacity per gateways (index)
Gateways III-01 IV-01 I-02 II-02 III-02 IV-02
Atlanta 78 53 64 78 84 129
Boston 110 70 73 90 102 127
Chicago 103 90 99 87 90 106
Los Angeles 93 95 89 102 89 98
Miami 103 110 92 102 100 107
New York 98 71 75 86 82 120
Newark 102 82 61 96 83 103
San Francisco 105 84 76 84 70 106
Toronto 124 89 92 89 92 122
Washington 122 79 83 97 105 134
Source: OAG
Table 4
Scheduled and planned capacity per carriers (index)
Carriers III-01 IV-01 I-02 II-02 III-02 IV-02
AF 115 82 85 86 89 117
AZ 113 76 66 91 57 106
BA 98 83 89 94 94 111
EI 110 85 79 66 65 86
IB 112 113 90 93 94 80
KL 100 80 81 83 89 119
LH 110 92 82 104 95 112
SK 116 88 88 97 94 128















AF Sky Team -18% -20% 702 10 6.6% 6.6% 100
AZ Sky Team -24% -36% 574 7 3.0% 2.0% 67
BA OneWorld -17% -22% 673 10 10.1% 11.8% 116
AL OneWorld -15% -10% 674 5 1.6% 1.2% 75
IB OneWorld 1% -37% 726 3 1.8% 1.8% 100
KL Wings -18% -20% 683 10 5.2% 5.3% 102
LH Star -8% -16% 687 10 10.8% 9.9% 92
SA Star -12% -6% 679 3 1.5% 2.0% 131
SR Qualiﬂyer -35% -34% 690 8 3.2% 0.5% 17
Note: 1 diﬀerence Nov01vs.Sep01 in nr.of seats, 2 %d i ﬀerence Sep01vs.Sep00
in bookings, Before the 11th September, 4 (A) Apr01-Jun01, (B) Apr02-Jun02,
(C) index
23Table 6
Estimation results of equation 11
Variable Coeﬀ.S t d . E r r o rt S t a t .P - v a l u e
Intercept -0.37 0.14 -2.71 0.0087
YIELD 5.68 1.94 2.92 0.0048
PAX 0.61 0.14 4.50 0.0000
R2=0.29 AdjR2=0.27 Obs.=67
Table 7
Estimation results of equation 12
Variable Coeﬀ.S t d . E r r o rt S t a t .P - v a l u e
Intercept -0.45 0.15 -2.97 0.00
YIELD 6.51 2.12 3.06 0.00
AF 0.43 0.51 0.85 0.40
AZ 0.62 0.33 1.90 0.06
BA 0.00 0.31 0.02 0.99
EI 1.12 0.48 2.33 0.02
IB 1.19 0.40 2.97 0.00
LH 0.43 0.54 0.78 0.44
KL 0.70 0.29 2.39 0.02
SK 0.45 0.71 0.63 0.53
SR 0.69 0.37 1.85 0.07
R2=0.43 AdjR2=0.32 Obs.=67
Table 8
Estimation results of equation 13
Variable Coeﬀ.S t d . E r r o rt S t a t .P - v a l u e
Intercept -0.43 0.14 -2.82 0.01
PAX 0.75 0.15 5.27 0.00
AF 7.31 2.69 2.72 0.01
AZ 9.15 2.47 3.71 0.00
BA 10.55 3.33 3.17 0.00
EI 7.42 2.95 2.51 0.01
IB 8.96 6.12 1.46 0.15
LH 5.75 2.40 2.40 0.02
KL 5.81 2.09 2.78 0.01
SK 6.10 3.49 1.75 0.09
SR 2.31 2.85 0.81 0.42
R2=0.44 AdjR2=0.33 Obs.=67
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AF medium [6.6] high [10.82, 1.3]
AZ low [3.0] low [0.8, 1.2]
BA high [10.1] high [8.9, 2.2]
EI low [1.6] medium [n.a., 2.2]
IB low [1.8] high [8.4, 1.8]
KL medium[5.2] medium [7.5, 2.3]
LH high [10.8] high [10.1, 2.0]
SK low [1.5] medium/low [2.5, 1.7]
SR low [3.2] low [n.a., n.a.]
Source: Amadeus dB.
Table 10
Expectation on crisis duration and ﬂexibility
long duration medium duration short duration
non-ﬂexible Lufthansa British Airways
medium ﬂexible AirFrance - KLM Alitalia
ﬂexible Iberia - Aer Lingus
























Figure 2: Expected impact of short and long-term proﬁtability reaction depend-




















Figure 3: Classiﬁcation of ﬁrms in terms of short- and long-term reaction
27